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As demonstrated in the Defendants' and Appellants' Brief, Defendants 
completely and/or substantially and materially perfonned all of their obligations and 
duties under the Settlement Agreement and are entitled to a satisfaction of judgment. 
However, because Red Bridge refused to release and satisfy the judgment according to 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants were compelled to seek judicial 
relief by filing their Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. In ruling on Defendants' 
Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment, the District Court committed reversible error in 
several significant respects which have been detailed by Defendants in their opening 
brief. 
As a consequence of the district court's error, Red Bridge received a staggering 
and unwarranted economic windfall. Red Bridge intentionally took advantage of the 
Court's procedural errors by presenting the case in a false and misleading light. Red 
Bridge has received and retained the full fruits of Defendants' performance of the 
Settlement Agreement, and has been awarded the full an1ount of the judgment as an 
unwarranted double recovery. Such inequity in light of Defendants' performance 
under the Settlement Agreement highlights the district court's reversible errors. 
The resolution of the parties' dispute required the district court to receive and 
consider evidence to determine whether (i) there was complete or substantial 
performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, (ii) whether there was a mutual 
or unilateral mistake in the Settlement Agreement that relieved Defendants of 
1 
SLC _2568958 
performance, (iii) whether Red Bridge had waived Defendants' performance as to one 
issue, (iv) and whether Red Bridge acted in good faith in negotiating a development 
agreement, and, ultimately, whether the judgment was satisfied. The resolution of 
these factual issues required an evidentiary hearing. The district court's refusal to 
permit the presentation of evidence under these circumstances constitutes reversible 
error. 
Defendants contend that not only did they comply with all the requirements and 
conditions of the Settlement Agreement, thereby entitling them to a release and 
satisfaction of the $2,000,000 Stipulated Judgment, but that it was clear error for the 
Court to allow Red Bridge to retain the substantial monetary and property benefits of 
Defendants' performance under the Settlement Agreement while at the same time 
permitting Red Bridge to keep and pursue collection of the full amount of the 
Stipulated Judgment, without requiring a valuation and accounting of what Defendants 
had given Red Bridge in performance under the Settlement Agreement. 
In denying Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction, the District Court erred, inter 
alia: (I) by refusing to allow Defendants an evidentiary hearing to resolve questions of 
fact concerning their performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement (2) by 
refusing to allow evidence of the parties' mutual mistake concerning an errant legal 
description of property included and attached to the Settlement Agreement; (3) 
incorrectly interpreting Utah law with respect to mistake, either mutual or unilateral; 
(4) by refusing to permit evidence on the question of Red Bridge's waiver; (5) by 
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failing to provide any ruling or basis upon which the Court denied Defendants' Motion 
for Satisfaction; ( 6) by ignoring evidence and failing to determine that the Defendants 
had substantially complied with the material tenns of the Settlement Agreement, and 
granting Red Bridge an unjustified and improper double recovery. 
ARGU1V1ENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DE~-YING DEFENDA .. NTS' 
l\10TION FOR SATISFACTION SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. Defendants Performed Their Obli2:ations Under the Settlement 
Arrreement and Vv ere Entitled to a Satisfaction of Jud~ent. 
In Red Bridge's Statement of Facts and argument, it argues incon-ectly that the 
tem1s of the Settlement Agreement were not perfon11ed by Defendants which thus 
justified the District Court's denial of Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. 
See Appellees' Brief at Statement of Facts, pp. 7-8 and Argument, generally. However, 
Red Bridge ignores undisputed facts demonstrating Defendants' performance, misstates 
the actual requirements of the Settlement Agreement in order to justify its en-oneous 
position, and ignores Defendants' right to an evidentiary hearing on disputed facts. 
For example, Red Bridge makes the argument that Defendants had not performed 
under §4( c) of the Settlement Agreement because they had "not transferred title to the 
Strip Parcels to Red Bridge." Id. at p. 7. However, Defendants were never required to 
transfer title to the Strip Parcels to Red Bridge under the Settlement Agreement unless the 
parties were unable to negotiate in good faith to enter into a mutually agreeable 




Bridge, the parties had in fact negotiated to enter into a mutually agreeable development 
agreement. In fact, Defendants had submitted evidence demonstrating that Red Bridge 
had accepted the Elim Valley Development Agreement in satisfaction of this requirement 
under the Settlement Agreement. See R. at 786; 895; 922. Moreover, the district court 
reached the same conclusion. Instead of conceding this point, as it had below, Red 
Bridge perpetuates the erroneous position that Defendants have not performed under the 
Settlement Agreement. 1 
Although Red Bridge inaccurately represents that all terms of the Settlement 
Agreement had not been performed by Defendants, the reality is that Defendants had in 
fact materially performed all conditions of the Settlement Agreement and were entitled to 
a satisfaction of judgment. Because space limitations of this Reply Brief do not permit 
another recitation of the facts and evidence demonstrating Defendants' performance, 
Defendants refer the Court to Appellants' Brief, which sets forth in detail the facts and 
evidence demonstrating Defendants' performance under the Settlement Agreement. See 
Appellants' Brief, including Statement of Facts Nos: 9 -14; 26; 35-36; 47; 50. Red 
Bridge's attempt to create artificial failures on Defendants' part with respect to 
compliance under the Settlement Agreement is without merit. 
Next, Red Bridge's Brief casually skips over the important details of Defendants' 
performances and instead creates a fiction by arguing that because Defendants have not 
1 When it became apparent to Red Bridge that the Defendants had fully performed under 
the Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge began to demand additional performances that 
were not required under the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 810). 
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paid the full amount of the judgment, they are of course not entitled to satisfaction of the 
judgment. See Appellee's Brief at p. 15. This argument is illogical and ignores the 
express terms of the Settlement Agreement which do not require the Defendants to pay 
the ''judgment" amount to entitle them to satisfaction of the judgment. Rather, the 
Defendants were entitled to a satisfaction of judgment upon completion of specified 
performances, which were in lieu of payment of the ''judgment." And, as Defendants 
have demonstrated, such perfonnances were completed. The attempt to manufacture 
breaches of the Settlement Agreement on Defendants' part, when no material breaches 
are present, is a common theme throughout Red Bridge's arguments, both below and 
perpetuated on appeal. However, the record does not support Red Bridge's arguments. 
Red Bridge further argues that Defendants were required to file a motion to set 
aside the judgment instead of a motion to satisfy the judgment. Id. at at p. 15. However, 
this reasoning is faulty and nonsensical because it again ignores the express tenns of the 
Settlement Agreement which require that upon performance of the conditions of the 
Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge was required to file a satisfaction of judgment -
which it refused to do. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 8B and Utah Res. Int 'I 
Inc. v. Mark Tech, Corp., 2014 UT 60,342 P.3d 779, and pursuant to the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement, Defendants filed their Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment in 
order to obtain the relief to which they were entitled. In doing so, the Defendants applied 




that Defendants were required to file a motion to set aside the judgment where the 
Settlement called for a satisfaction of judgment. 
B. Defendants' Performance Does Not Present A Non-Justiciable 
Question Because An Actual Or Innninent Clash Of Legal Rights 
Between The Parties Still Exists. 
Relying on irrelevant precedent, Red Bridge next asserts that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of the issues presented on appeal because any decision 
rendered regarding Defendants' performance under the Settlement Agreement would 
constitute an advisory opinion. See Red Bridge's Brief at 16-17. This is simply 
incorrect. Although Red Bridge is correct that courts are not a forum for rendering 
advisory opinions, it fails to recognize that such is only the case"[ w]here there exists no 
more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of 
legislation to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find 
themselves." Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ~ 5, 97 P.3d 722 (quoting Redwood 
Gym v. Salt Lake County Conun., 624 P.2d 1138, 48 (Utah 1981). 
For example, in the principal case relied on by Red Bridge, the Utah Transit 
Authority (''UT A") brought a cause of action against the union stennning from failed 
collective bargaining negotiations. See Utah Transit Authority v. Local 382 of the 
Anialgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75,289 P.3d 582. While the dispute was on 
appeal, the parties negotiated and entered into a new collective bargaining agreement. 
See id. at~~ 9-12. In finding that the "subsequent negotiation and new collective 
bargaining agreement rendered the case moot and accordingly non-justiciable[,]" the 
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Court reasoned that "\\rhere the issues that v;.rere before the trial court no longer exist, the 
appellate court will not review the case. An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the 
appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the 
relief requested impossible or ofno legal effect.'' Id. at~ 14 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
In essence, "[t]he defining feature of a moot controversy is the lack of capacity for 
the court to order a remedy that will have a meaningful impact on the practical positions 
of the parties." Id. at~ 24. In other words, "[i]n order to constitute a justiciable 
controversy, a conflict over the application of a legal provision must have sharpened into 
an actual or irmninent clash of legal rights and obligations between the pa1ties thereto." 
Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ~ 5 (quoting Redwood Gym, 624 P.2d at 1148). 
Here, the conflict regarding whether Defendants are entitled to a satisfaction of 
judgment remains an actual or innninent clash of legal rights and obligations between the 
parties. Unlike the dispute in Utah Transit Authority, this dispute has not been resolved 
while on appeal and does not constitute a hypothetical application for the future. Further, 
this dispute was at issue and presented to the district court. Therefore, because this 
Court's decision regarding whether the district court erred can still provide relief that will 
have a legal effect upon the parties, such a decision is not an advisory opinion. 
Red Bridge attempts to complicate the issue by asserting that because Defendants' 
underlying motion was for a satisfaction of judgment rather than a motion to enforce the 




whether Defendants performed can only be construed as an advisory opinion. See Red 
Bridge's Brief, at 16. As set forth above, this argument is without merit and simply an 
attempt to confuse the issue. This appeal is grounded on the district court's eITor in 
refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, incorrect application of the law, and disregard 
of undisputed facts, among other things. The styling or naming of Defendants' 
underlying Motion does not make a decision regarding whether the district court erred in 
denying Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment an advisory opinion. Having 
been denied their right to satisfaction of judgment by the error of the district court, 
Defendants cannot be denied the right of appeal because they did not go back to the 
district court with the same arguments under a differently titled motion. 
C. The District Court Erred by Failing to Make Sufficient Findings and 
Conclusions and by Failing to Conduct an Evidentiary Hearing. 
Red Bridge incorrectly claims there was no error below because the district court 
did not "convert" the parties' motions into cross motions for summary judgment. 
However, Red Bridge's argument disregards the district court's clear and unambiguous 
statement that it was considering the motions as cross motions for summary judgment. 
(Tr. at 5). Case law establishes that, "[i]t is the substance, not the labeling, of a [pleading] 
that is dispositive in determining the character of the [pleading]." State, in interest of 
J.D., 2013 UT App 14, i12, 295 P.3d 1167 (quotations and citation omitted). This 




\7'/b.ile Red Bridge asserts there is no proper procedure for the district court to 
convert the Defendants' motion to a summary judgment motion, such argument cannot 
pretend it didn't happen. The record is clear that it was the district court's decision to 
treat the motions of the parties as cross motions for summary judgment. The district 
court converted the parties' motions, treated them as cross motions for summary 
judgment, and then committed reversible error in failing to apply legal standards to his 
resolution of the motions. Because the district comt treated Defendants' motion as a 
motion for summary judgment, the district court was then obligated to meet the 
evidentiary and procedural requirements applicable to motions for summary judgment, 
including the requirement that sunu11aI)' judgment can be entered only when the record 
shows "that there is no genuine issue of material fact". (Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)) .. In this 
case, the district court erred by granting Red Bridge's motion where there were multiple 
and genuine issues of material fact, and by failing to detail the district court's findings 
and conclusions. 
Even beyond the district court's failure to comply with the specific requirements 
relating to motions for summary judgment, the district court failed to comply with Rule 
52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and provide a statement explaining the grounds 
· for its decision. Rule 52 requires that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without ajury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon .... " Utah R. Civ. P. 52. "It is well settled in this 
jurisdiction that failure to make findings of fact on material issues is error, and is 
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ordinarily prejudicial." Duncan v. Henunelwright, 186 P.2d 965, 968-69 (Utah 1947). 
"Moreover, such factual findings must be complete and detailed." Anned Forces Ins. 
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ~~ 27-28, 70 P.3d 35. 
In this case, the district court failed to give any explanation for its ultimate 
decision to deny Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction and grant Red Bridge's motion, and 
it failed to make the required detailed findings orally or written. On this point, the entire 
extent of the district court's decision was made orally as follows: 
Okay. Well, as far as the motion-motion for satisfaction of judgement, I will 
deny that motion. I don't think it's well taken on many fronts but clearly not 
sufficient for either substantively and maybe procedurally. So I'm going to deny 
that. 
Tr., 59: 14-18. This was the entire breadth of the court's ruling with respect to the 
Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. Obviously, such is insufficient and 
does not meet the requirements of Rule 52. The district court failed to make any further 
fmdings and did not provide any reasoning behind its blanket denial of Defendants' 
motion. Particularly, the district court never made any finding that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact that would make summary judgment appropriate. In light of this 
lack of findings, the district court should have allowed and heard evidence in order to 
make determinations of factual disputes. The district court's failure is prejudicial and 
requires that this Court reverse the district court's order and/or remand the matter to the 
district court with instructions to follow proper procedure and receive the necessary 
evidence in order for appropriate findings to be made. 
10 
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Next, Red Bridge asserts that the district cout1 properly considered evidence. See 
Appellee's Brief at p. 18. This disregards the plain record of the hearing. \\lbile Red 
Bridge can only point to the pretrial submission of limited stipulated facts and exhibits, 
the parties' submission of certain agreed upon facts and exhibits were not the extent of 
the evidence intended to be introduced by the parties. (R. at 2185). Indeed, as specified 
in the pretrial order, the parties came prepared to offer evidence and testimony that the 
district court refused to take or hear. Id. The pretrial order provided that the hearing 
would be an evidentiary hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, and tlrroughout 
opening argument, counsel for the Defendants stated his intention and request to put on 
evidence. (Tr. 5: 10 - 7: 1 ). The district com1 acknowledged the evidentiary purpose of 
the hearing at the outset, but then, without explanation disregarded the request to put on 
evidence by Defendants' counsel and ruled without allowing any evidence and testimony. 
Importantly, the district court never provided any reason to suppmi its decision or 
identified any factual basis for its decision. This leaves the parties and this Court 
guessing why the district court did what it did, and emphasizes the error and prejudice 
caused by the district comi's failure to allow evidence and provide required findings. 
Thus, it is demonstrably untrue to suggest that the Court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing. 
To the extent the district Com1's Order states it relied on Stipulated Facts and 
Exhibits, these Stipulated Facts and Exhibits were simply basic, foundational background 
facts and certain exhibits the parties agreed upon in advance of the evidentiary hearing. 
11 
SLC _ 2568958 
c. 
\i4;J 
There were a number of material facts in dispute that required resolution through the 
taking of evidence. Indeed, the Defendants came prepared with additional exhibits and 
witnesses as was anticipated by the parties pursuant to the pretrial order. The stipulated 
facts or exhibits were insufficient and incomplete for the district court to make any 
decision on the contested issues, let alone provide a basis for a required, well-reasoned 
decision. This further highlights how the district court's lack of findings or conclusions 
has left the parties guessing about how and on what basis the district court reached its 
decision. 
Moreover, even Red Bridge is guessing or assuming what the district court did or 
did not rely on. Specifically, Red Bridge asserts that the district court made its decision 
as a matter of law. Appellee Brief, pg. 19. This is incorrect, as the district court never 
stated this conclusion but instead acknowledged that it was making its decision on several 
fronts, including substantive and "maybe procedural[]" reasons. Tr., 59: 14-18. Red 
Bridge's attempt to argue that the court made its determination as a matter of law is 
unsupported because the district court provided no findings or conclusions that could 
support such an argument, even as to the legal basis for the Court's decision. 
Next, Red Bridge erroneously asserts that no parole evidence could have been 
considered because the settlement agreement was an integrated document. This position 
is unsupported by the clear weight of Utah law. Utah law requires the review of parole 
evidence to determine an issue of mistake, even in the face of an integrated document. 
See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT ,I 20, 182 P.3d 326; E&H Land, Ltd. v. 
12 
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Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ~ 25, 336 P.3d 1077 (holding '"It is true that 
Tangren recognized that 'mistake' is one of several grounds upon which courts may 
consider 'extrinsic evidence in support of an argument that the contract is not valid' 
despite a clear integration clause ... But the issue in Tangren "'ras whether parol 
evidence was admissible to demonstrate whether or not a contract was integrated, not 
whether a mutual mistake warranted refonnation of the parties' agreement ... 
Consequently, the district court erred when it determined that the REPC's integration 
clause precluded any consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve E&H's reformation 
due to mutual mistake claim.") (citation omitted); Tf'est One Trust Co. v. A1orrison, 861 
P .2d I 058, I 068 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The foregoing case law affin11atively establishes 
that it is error for the district court to preclude consideration of extrinsic evidence to 
resolve a claim of mistake. Consequently, the district court could not have ruled as a 
matter of law because the issue of mistake, asserted by Defendants, was a question of fact 
that required the consideration of extrinsic evidence. 
Finally, the issue on appeal regarding the district court's failure to hold an 
evidentiary hearing was clearly preserved by the Defendants. Utah law requires that in 
order to "preserve [an] issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial 
court." Hart v. Salt Lake County, Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997). As set forth 
herein, the district comi issued notice of an evidentiary hearing upon which the 
Defendants relied. [R. at 2156]. The Defendants came to the hearing prepared to present 
evidence and testimony. The district court then requested opening arguments. (R. at 
13 
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3891, Tr. pp. 3-5). Counsel for the Defendants stated his intention and request to put on 
evidence and clarified the court's instructions by asking "you'd like some argument at 
this point prior to putting on evidence?" To which the court replied: "you can make an 
opening statement, if you like." (Id.; Tr. pp. 4-5) ( emphasis added). 
Based on the court's instructions, both parties presented their opening arguments 
and Defendants stated what the evidence would show, as is typical of an opening 
argument. Defendants provided a proffer in their opening argument of what their 
evidence would present. (Tr. 5:10 - 7:1; 7:3 - 8:7; 11 :7-22). Then the district court 
unexpectedly ruled at the close of the opening statements without providing the 
Defendants the chance to counter or proffer anything further, or to present evidence. Tr., 
59: 14-18. Defendants properly raised and preserved the issue of their intent and request 
to put on evidence at the evidentiary hearing. In addition, the Defendants proffered and 
explained the evidence it would present as the Defendants identified previously in their 
Appellant Brief, with the anticipation of presenting the evidence. See Appellants' Brief, 
pgs. 28-30. Pursuant to Hart, the Defendants have sufficiently preserved this issue for 
appeal. 
In sum, the district court committed reversible error in failing to take evidence and 
to make proper findings and conclusions. 
14 
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D. The District Court Failed to Allow or Hear Evidence of a 1v1utual 
:Mistake. 
The district court erred in precluding Defendants from presenting evidence 
regarding mutual mistake. Utah law is clear that a district court errs ,:vhen it fails to 
consider extrinsic evidence when a mutual mistake is asserted. See Wolf Afountain 
Resorts, LC v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425, ,, 9-12, 268 P.3d 872. Particularly, in 
FVolf A1ountain, "Wolf Mountain offered extrinsic evidence [of a mutual mistake], but the 
district court refused to consider that evidence." Id. at, 11. The Utah Court of Appeals 
detennined that the failure to consider the extrinsic evidence "was error by the district 
court." Id.; see also E & H Land, Ltd. v. Fannington City, 2014 UT App 237, ~ 24,336 
P.3d 1077 ("Based on the Tangren decision, the district court refused to consider any 
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent and awarded Farmington summary judgment on 
the reformation claim. We conclude that the district court should have considered 
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent."); TY. One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 
I 061 (Utah Ct. App. 1993 )("If the mutual mistake is established by clear and convincing 
evidence, a document may be refom1ed. Therefore, in this case the trial court should 
have considered extrinsic evidence that may have demonstrated that the parties intended 
the subject properties to be held as partnership assets, rather than as joint tenancies with 
rights of survivorship."(emphasis added)). 
15 
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In this case, Defendants proffered to the Court and were prepared to offer evidence 
concerning mutual mistake that would have established the same. 2 Contrary to Red 
Bridge's assertions, Defendants directly addressed the evidence they intended to 
introduce regarding the asserted mutual mistake. At the hearing, Defendants' counsel 
expressly stated to the court what the evidence would show (with the understanding they 
would later be able to actually present and admit such evidence).3 This evidence includes 
2 Red Bridge incorrectly states that Defendants conceded that the district court should not 
consider evidence regarding mistake. In fact, the portion of the hearing transcript to 
which Red Bridge cites discusses the colloquy between counsel and the court regarding 
the general parol evidence rule regarding whether parol evidence may be received on 
integrated contracts ( on which, as discussed herein, Red Bridge and the Court were in 
error). However, from a reading of the identified portions of the transcript, as well as the 
entire transcript, Defendants' counsel clearly argues that the Defendants intended to offer 
and admit extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the mutual mistake. Tr. 12:6-14. The 
Defendants did not concede that evidence should not be received on the issue of mutual 
mistake; rather, the Defendants stated their intent to introduce such evidence while at the 
same time informing the court that even from a reading of the Settlement Agreement, 
therewasevidenceofamistake. Id. atp. 16. 
3 Defendants' counsel stated at the hearing, 
At the time the settlement was reached, I don't think that any of the parties 
contemplated that that strip parcel included that triangle of Elim Valley property. The 
entire discussions of the settlement agreement, the entire negotiation was with Mellon 
Valley on its property. This litigation, they had an expert, they had other individuals 
that identified the strip parcels, they knew about them, and they knew what Elim 
Valley owned and didn't own. The legal description, in the haste of getting the 
settlement agreement completed before trial, did include that triangle. And that is, I 
would argue is a mutual mistake. 
Tr. 11: 8-18. In addition to this evidence, Defendants also asserted that the language of 
the Settlement Agreement supports that there was an error in the legal description. In 
sum, the parties, at the time of entering the Settlement Agreement, were unaware that a 
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the language of the Settlement Agreement, testimony of individuals with knowledge 
concern the engineering and legal description errors, documentary history, and testimony 
of the parties regarding their intent and reliance on the incorrect legal description. 
However, prior to hearing any evidence, the district court curiously denied Defendants' 
motion as to mutual mistake based on the "odds."4 Such an analysis is both unbecoming 
a judicial proceeding (which should not be a game of chance) and in error. In sum, the 
district court erred in failing to allow Defendants to present evidence regarding mutual 
mistake. 
E. The District Court Erred in Failing to Allow and Consider Evidence of 
a Unilateral Mistake. 
The Defendants have identified that the district court made an error of law by not 
allowing or considering evidence of a unilateral mistake. If the district court had taken 
evidence and determined that a mutual mistake did not occur it should have then 
considered evidence concerning a unilateral mistake. Pai.1icularly, at the heaiing, the 
Defendants argued facts that would be presented to support a unilateral mistake. Tr. 11: 
7-22. 
parcel owned by a third party was included in the legal description. See Appellants' Brief 
Facts, 1115-25. 
4 The district court stated, "About parole [sic] evidence. And I mean, your theory is a 
theory, but f011y-to-one odds. I don't get that. Fifty-to-one odds, probably. So if you 
think your theory is worth fifty-to-one odds, I can see maybe approaching that way." Tr. 
59:6-10. Based on this analysis (or lack thereof) the district court denied Defendants' 




Defendants contend that they can establish the required showing to allow a 
reformation of the Agreement on the basis of a unilateral mistake. See Rothe v. Rothe, 
787 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)("The Utah Supreme Court has also clarified that 
unilateral mistake in the formalization of a writing may also provide an appropriate basis 
for refonnation."); Davis v. Mulholland, 475 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah 1970)("Essential 
conditions to [ unilateral mistake] are (I) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence 
that to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscionable. (2) The matter as 
to which the mistake was made must relate to a material feature of the contract. (3) 
Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake. (4) It must be possible to give relief by way of 
rescission without serious prejudice to the other party except the loss of his bargain."). 
With respect to the foregoing, Defendants explained below that holding the 
Defendants to this mistake "would be of great consequence because Mellon Valley 
complied in every other aspect of this ... agreement." Tr. 14: 23-25. Enforcing the 
mistake would mean that Red Bridge would receive an incredible windfall and essentially 
collect two times the amount of the agreed upon value of the Agreement. Red Bridge has 
retained the entire benefit of the Defendants' performances under the Settlement 
Agreement in addition to collecting on the $2 million judgment all on the basis of the 
error or mistake in the legal description as set forth herein. 
Moreover, the mistake occurred despite the Defendants exercise of ordinary 
diligence. Defendants reasonably relied on a sunrey and a sunrey map to include the 
18 
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con-ect legal description of land actually owned by the Defendants. See Appellant Brief 
Facts~ ~ 16. In addition~ relief through reformation is available without serious prejudice 
to Red Bridge. The I/10th of an acre at issue did not hann Red Bridge's stated purpose of 
requiring the easements across the Strip Parcels as part of the Settlement Agreement, 
which was to allow for two access points on each Strip Parcel. See Tr. 13:19-25; see also 
Appellant Brief Fact, ,r 19. In sum, the district court erred and misinterpreted the law in 
failing to allow Defendants to present evidence regarding unilateral mistake. Moreover, 
Defendants have also established they were prepared to introduce probative evidence of 
such a mistake. 
F. Defendants Substantially Complied \vith the Settlement A~ffeement. 
Red Bridge does not and cannot cite to any law in its attempt to oppose 
Defendants' argument regarding substantial compliance. Red Bridge's unsupported 
assertions are insufficient to challenge the clear case law applicable to contracts. Red 
Bridge admits that principles of contract law apply to settlement agreements. (Appellee 
Brief, p. 21 ). Utah law provides that "[ o ]nly a material breach will excuse further 
performance by the non-breaching pa11y." Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ,I 26,303 
P. 3d 1030. Determining a material breach is a question of fact. Orlob v. T.flasatch Med. 
Afgmt., 2005 UT App 430, ,r 26, 124 P.3d 269. The district comi failed to take evidence 
to assess the factual question of whether Defendants materially breached the Settlement 
Agreement. The Defendants have established that they materially complied with the 
Settlement Agreement and Red Bridge cannot be excused from further perfom1ance. 
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G. The District Court Erred in its Intemretation and Application of 
Waiver. 
Red Bridge waived the right to demand the Master Communications Easement be 
removed on the Strip Parcels. Red Bridge asserts that its actions did not waive its rights. 
This is incorrect. Utah case law establishes that a waiver can be found from a party's 
conduct when it establishes an intent to waive or that such conduct is "at least ... 
inconsistent with any other intent." Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P .2d 130, 
133 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(intemal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, a "[f]ailure 
to adhere to the precise terms of the contract, combined with the absence of notice of a 
party's intention to insist on strict compliance, is enough evidence to support a finding of 
waiver." Id. ( citation omitted). Moreover, this Court has established that "one cannot 
prevent a waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to waive, where his 
or her actions clearly indicate such an intent." Id. (citation omitted). 
In this case, Red Bridge's email and conduct establishe a waiver of any right to 
demand that the Master Conununications Easement be removed on the Strip Parcels. 
Instead, Red Bridge outlined in its email the title issues requiring to be corrected and 
intentionally did not include the Master Communication Easement, which expressed an 
intent that can only be consistent with waiver. Notably, Red Bridge has never contended 
its omission of the Master Communications Easement was inadvertent or mistaken. In 
sum, the implication of Red Bridge's actions is sufficient to establish waiver. 
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Second, a nom:vaiver provision in a contract is not dispositive as "courts have 
concluded that they too may be waived." Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik: 890 P.2d 7, 
1 On. 5 (Utah Ct. App. l 995)("There is substantial authority against giving literal and full 
effect to nom:vaiver provisions; courts have concluded that they too may be 
waived.")(internal quotations and citation omitted). Red Bridge incorrectly argues that 
the non-waiver provision is dispositive on the issue of waiver. Appelllee's Brief, pg. 28. 
However, as provided in Living Scriptures, Inc., Red Bridge's actions still constitute a 
waiver in this case. 5 Red Bridge acted consistent with a waiver and the district court 
erred in its interpretation and application of waiver. 
II. RED BRIDGE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS UNREASONABLE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
A. Red Bridge does not Dispute that its Request for Attornevs' Fees 
Should be Reversed when the District Court's Prior Ruling is Reversed. 
For the reasons already established in the Appellants' Brief, Red Bridge is no 
longer the prevailing party and will not be entitled to attorneys' fees. If the district 
court's decision regarding the Defendant's motion is reversed, the Defendants will 
become the prevailing party and Red Bridge will no longer be entitled to attorneys' fees. 
Red Bridge does not dispute this issue in its Appellee Brief. 
5 Red Bridge also argues that even if it did waive the issue of the Master Communication 
Easement, the judgment lien on the Snip Parcels establishes that the Defendants did not 
comply with the Settlement Agreement. However, this issue is irrelevant to the issue of 
waiver regarding the Master Communications Easement. The issue of the judgment lien 




B. The District Court Erred in Granting Red Bridge Excessive 
Attorneys' Fees. 
Red Bridge incorrectly argues that its attorneys' fees do not have to be reasonable 
but that its fees were in fact reasonable. Appellee's Brief at pg. 29n. 15. However, Red 
Bridge fails to recognize that attorneys' fees must always be reasonable, even if the 
contract does not provide that the attorneys' fees must be reasonable. Equitable Life & 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P .2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct.App.) ("If provided for by contract, 
attorney fees are awarded in accordance with the terms of that contract. Although such an 
award is a matter of legal right, it must be reasonable and supported by adequate 
evidence."). Further, "[r]easonable attorneys fees are not measured by what an attorney 
actually bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case determinative in computing 
fees." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985). 
The court must also consider "the provision in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility which specifies the elements that should be considered in setting 
reasonable attorneys fees." Id. Important factors, among others, include the difficulty of 
the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of 
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise 
and experience of the attorneys involved." Id. Importantly, "[a] trial court abuses its 
discretion when its fee award is unreasonable." Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 2006 
UT App 305, ~ 25, 145 P.3d 1146. 
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In this case, the district court erred by granting Red Bridge excessive attorneys' 
fees. Defendants raised an objection to Red Bridge's excessive attorneys' fees and the 
district cow1 improperly denied their objection. As already discussed in Appellants' 
Brief, (1) Red Bridge's counsel's hourly rate was excessive at $550 per hour and (2) Red 
Bridge's counsel was inefficient. Red Bridge's counsel billed approximately 36% more 
than Defendants' counsel at an hourly rate over double that of Defendants' counsel. This 
establishes the excessive amount of Red Bridge's attorneys' fees. \\Thile Red Bridge 
states that the district court considered the correct factors and thus did not err, it fails to 
acknowledge that a result of unreasonable attorneys' fees is en-or. The hourly amount 
Red Bridge's counsel charged and the time Red Bridge's counsel billed for a motion for 
satisfaction of judgment proceedings was unreasonable. The district court erred in 
accepting Red Bridge's claims and blanket statements about reasonableness without 
looking further into assessing the reasonableness of Red Bridge's efficiency and hourly 
rates and thus granted excessive fees. In sum, the district court e~ed in granting Red 
Bridge unreasonable attorneys' fees and its order on fees should be reversed or be 
remanded for further findings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and upon the authority set forth herein, Appellant requests the 
Court of Appeals to reverse the Orders appealed from and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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